Human trafficking and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. by Moran, Clare
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 32-45  ISSN: 2340-9592 
32 
 
 
 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
CLARE FRANCES MORAN
1
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The case for extending the reach of the Rome Statute to the crime of human trafficking has 
not yet been made in detail. The brutality which occurs when human beings are trafficked by criminal 
gangs is of an equally egregious nature as the other crimes covered by the Rome Statute and yet it does 
not fall within the remit of the International Criminal Court. Such trafficking may also fall outwith the 
definition of slavery as a crime against humanity, particularly given the State policy threshold set by the 
Statute. This paper seeks to explore the viability of the inclusion of human trafficking as a discrete 
international crime within the Rome Statute as a response to this loophole.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Slavery Convention, which entered into force on 9 March 1927, was the 
first international agreement to outlaw, without discrimination based on gender or race, 
the practice of exercising ‘any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership’, 
as held in Article 1(1), over an individual. This internationally agreed definition of 
slavery has endured, being referenced in preference to the previous international 
agreements in this area which defined slavery as being the sexual exploitation of 
Caucasian women and girls. Indeed, subsequent regional and international human rights 
and criminal law instruments affirm the prohibition, without qualification or limitation, 
of the practice of slavery. The age of the instruments would give the impression that the 
problem of slavery has been eradicated, without need for further legal intervention. 
However it would appear that it has simply evolved.  Slavery’s modern incarnation 
(UNODC, 2009: 6) human trafficking, is termed far more expansively than its ancestor. 
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The ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbour or receipt of persons’ however 
coercively or forcibly that may be done, financial incentives included, is considered 
trafficking, where the aim is for ‘a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation’ (UN Convention 2000: article 3(a)). Exploitation is then 
defined expansively. The myriad instruments in existence which attempt to eliminate 
the exploitative domination of one person over another, and most recently the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, demonstrate a continual and collective effort to eradicate the bane of slavery, 
and the newer, more expansive definition of trafficking, from societies throughout the 
world. However, the current approach in this area is to treat the problem as 
transnational, in that countries should cooperate and deal with prosecutions on a 
national basis (UN Convention 2000: article 1) rather than to prosecute on an 
international basis. The instruments demonstrate a willingness to approach the problem 
collectively, but the concept of collective action through an existing single entity 
(Cooper, 2011) has not fully been discussed by either the relevant organisations or the 
literature in this area.  
 
Human trafficking is clearly a violation of both international human rights 
standards which apply to States and international criminal law, but despite this 
seemingly obvious gap, the case for extending the reach of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (hereafter, the ‘Rome Statute) in the particularly critical 
area of human trafficking does not seem to have been made in any great detail as of yet. 
The International Criminal Court (hereafter, ‘ICC’), under article five of the Rome 
Statute, has jurisdiction over ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’ (Rome Statute: article 5) and the same article creates a degree of 
priority for the prosecution of such violations. However it is arguable that the brutality 
which occurs when human beings are trafficked for the purposes of sexual exploitation 
by criminal gangs is of an equally egregious nature as those covered by the Rome 
Statute and yet does not fall within the remit of the ICC. The scale of the problem is 
equally earth-shattering: the number of actual victims is thought to far outweigh the 
number of identified victims and globally, figures range from 800,000 (Wyler and 
Syskin, 2010: 3) to 2.5million (Belser, 2005: 3) people who suffer as a result of being 
trafficked each year. The purpose of this work, therefore, is to determine the potential of 
extending the reach of the Rome Statute in this way. As part of the general prohibition 
on slavery in international law, (Rome Statute: article 7(1)(c), note) the Rome Statute 
has already characterised slavery as a crime against humanity, inclusive of human 
trafficking. However, this is only where slavery is conducted as part of a State policy 
(Rome Statute: article 7(2)(a)), effectively as a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ (Rome 
Statute: article 7(1)). Gangs which operate human trafficking rings may not be tried 
before the ICC. This limitation prevents the organisational policies of criminal gangs 
which conduct human trafficking from being the subject of prosecution at the ICC.  
 
This paper will therefore seek to argue that human trafficking should be 
included within the jurisdiction of the ICC as a core international crime rather than a 
crime against humanity, using the threshold requirements of the crime of genocide as a 
theoretical legal model, without hinging prosecution on the requirement that the crime 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 3 (December 2014) pp. 32-45  ISSN: 2340-9592 
 
34 
be ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack.’ This does not imply that 
there is any analogy between the crimes, rather that the threshold test may also be useful 
in the context of human trafficking. The study is one of theory, exploring the black 
letter law in the Rome Statute and other relevant international instruments and 
uncovering the theory at the heart of these laws. This work will firstly explore the 
intention to include human trafficking as a crime within the jurisdiction of the court, 
examining the limitations incumbent on addressing the issue via the framework of 
crimes against humanity. The second issue will be to understand whether the idea of an 
‘organizational policy’ within the Rome Statute should extend to the conduct of 
organised criminal gangs. The last part will explore the argued suitability of establishing 
human trafficking as a core crime, within the jurisdiction of the ICC under article five 
and will use the theoretical model of genocide to determine the viability of this 
proposition. The aim is not to compare genocide and human trafficking, but rather to 
apply the court’s approach to determining jurisdiction over a charge of genocide to the 
idea of human trafficking. As a matter of limitation, the subject matter of this paper will 
comprise only acts of human trafficking which are unrelated to internal or international 
conflict, the main motivation in those cases being that of profit. 
 
II. THE INTENTION TO INCLUDE HUMAN TRAFFICKING WITHIN THE STATUTE  
 
The focus of this part to the work is to examine the argued intention to include 
human trafficking as part of the Rome Statute, viewing it as a form of modern slavery. 
Slavery has been characterised as a crime against humanity within the Rome Statute 
(Rome Statute: article 7(1)(c)), and human trafficking has been included as part of the 
definition of enslavement (Rome Statute: article 7(2)(c)). The potential of this effort 
will be examined, and the issues which arise in classifying human trafficking as a crime 
against humanity will be also explored. 
 
The ICC under the Rome Statute has jurisdiction over ‘the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole,’ (Rome Statute: preamble) giving 
it authority to try the individual accused of the crime (Rome Statute: article 1). The 
caveats to such jurisdiction include that the individual should be a national of a State 
Party to the treaty (Rome Statute: Article 12(2)(b)) or that the territory, including 
vessels and aircraft in which the crime was committed was that of a State Party (Rome 
Statute: Article 12(2)(a)) to the Rome Statute, or that the State in which the crime was 
committed permits the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the proceedings (Rome Statute: 
Article 12(3)). The crimes themselves are specified in article five of the Rome Statute, 
which states that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over acts of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and aggression (Rome Statute: Article 5(1)). At present, the 
definition of enslavement within the Rome Statute makes explicit reference to the crime 
of human trafficking (Rome Statute: Article 7(2)(c)) but there is no further definition 
offered by either the Statute itself or the Elements of Crimes (hereafter, ‘Elements’). 
Enslavement under the Rome Statute is defined as in the Slavery Convention under 
article 1, noting the importance of the idea of ‘ownership(Rome Statute: article 7(2)(c)). 
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However, this definition and the Rome Statute itself came into being prior to the 
Trafficking Protocol, which defines trafficking as, effectively, all practices in 
connection with and for the purposes of slavery, under article 3(a), criminalising: 
 
“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of 
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or 
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another 
person, for the purpose of exploitation.” 
 
The idea of ownership is replaced by that of ‘control over another person, for the 
purposes of exploitation,’ arguably a more stringent standard than that of ownership or 
property rights. Therefore the threshold adopted by the Rome Statute is automatically 
higher and would require a demonstration of the attributes of ownership before an 
individual could be tried on a charge of enslavement at the ICC. The reliance on the 
prior definition of slavery does not necessarily reflect an intention to exclude trafficking 
as a discrete crime. Rather the specific inclusion of the word ‘trafficking’ in the 
definition of enslavement arguably demonstrates that there was a clear intention to 
include the crime as it existed in international law at that time. The clear intention to 
include human trafficking can be seen in other crimes against humanity, which reflect 
different parts of the current definition. 
 
Within article seven of the Rome Statute, there are two other crimes against 
humanity which reflect aspects of the United Nations (hereafter, ‘UN’) definition of 
human trafficking:  ‘deportation and forcible transfer of population,’ (Rome Statute: 
article 7(1)(d)) which encompasses the ‘recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt or persons, by means of threat or the use of force or other forms of coercion’ 
(UN Convention 2000: Protocol, article 3(a)) and ‘rape, sexual slavery and enforced 
prostitution’ (Rome Statute: article 7(1)(g)) which includes the exploitation (UN 
Convention 2000: Protocol, article 3(a)) aspect to current human trafficking definition. 
Deportation and forcible transfer is defined as being ‘the displacement of persons by 
expulsion’ (Rome Statute: article 7(1)(d)) from the area in which they are legally 
entitled to be, and with the inclusion of the phrase ‘other coercive acts’ (Rome Statute: 
article 7(1)(d)) the definition expands to fit the concept of human trafficking, in which 
victims have no free choice to comply with the demands of the traffickers. This is 
particularly relevant when human trafficking is viewed as ‘a particularly abusive form 
of migration’ (UNHCHR 2002: Introduction) but it does require that the victims were 
lawfully present in the territory from which they were trafficked. Given that the process 
has to begin somewhere, and that individuals are generally trafficked from their home 
countries, this requirement does not represent an insurmountable obstacle, but 
nonetheless may preclude the trafficking of some victims such as those who are 
stateless, or illegally working within another country. (Obokata, 2005: 450) 
 
The inclusion of rape and sexual slavery as a crime against humanity also 
creates provision for instances in which the exploitation of the individual was for sexual 
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purposes or where the ‘ownership’ threshold was reached. Reflecting briefly, it is clear 
that the Rome Statute has intended to include human trafficking within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC. However its inclusion as a crime against humanity creates a limitation, 
rather than a threshold, of an underpinning policy element. This limitation is 
problematic for a diffuse problem such as human trafficking. Equally, its attachment to 
the idea of ownership may hamper the incorporation of human trafficking offences into 
the framework of crimes against humanity, regardless of the direct relationship both 
have to the same fundamental requirement: ‘use’ of a person in the way that an object 
would typically be ‘used.’ 
 
Be that as it may, the purposive interpretation of the Rome Statute is 
undermined when confronted with the requirement that a crime against humanity can 
only be termed as such ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack’ (Rome Statute: 
Article 7(1)) There are therefore three parts to this requirement which ought to receive 
attention. First, the idea of a ‘widespread or systematic attack,’ second, the concept of a 
‘civilian population’ and third, ‘knowledge of the attack’ as part of the plan or policy. 
The ‘widespread or systematic’ aspect does not necessarily preclude human trafficking 
offences, particularly as committed by organised criminal gangs. The aim of 
prosecuting at the ICC would be to remove those at the helm of such gangs and 
therefore the most organised are likely to have a system in place, which would then 
reflect the ‘systematic’ approach to the commission of the crime. As stated by Jane 
Kim, ‘it is unlikely that each trafficker traffics one North Korean refugee woman and 
then ends their operation, never to traffic again’ (Kim, 2011:24). Similarly, the 
individual working within such a gang would be aware of the ‘organizational policy’ 
which he is carrying out. It appears something of a baseless argument for an accused to 
claim that he or she considered him or herself the only trafficker within a criminal gang, 
particularly where the heads of the gangs are being targeted for prosecution. Thus the 
threshold that there ought to be ‘knowledge of the attack’ is not one which bears 
particular relevance to this type of crime. The lack of knowledge that an individual was 
trafficking individuals is difficult to understand: those in charge of criminal operations 
would most likely be aware of the consequences of their actions and thus the 
‘knowledge’ element of the crime does not require further discussion for the purposes of 
this particular argument. 
 
The inclusion of the words ‘civilian population’ indicates from the outset that 
the target of the Rome Statute is those who act on behalf of a State. This is clarified by 
the Elements of Crimes, which note on page 5 that the attack must be carried out 
‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack 
… (which) requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an 
attack against a civilian population.’ It has been noted that there was a perceived fear 
regarding the removal of the State or organizational policy requirement (Halling, 2010) 
on the grounds that this would cover events which were both criminal and widespread, 
but did not necessarily reach the ‘most serious crimes of international concern’ 
threshold set by the Rome Statute. The inclusion of this threshold for crimes against 
humanity is relevant in the context of other crimes against humanity, and therefore it is 
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not argued that the ‘State or organizational policy’ requirement should be removed. 
Unless it could be shown that this could extend to the work of organised criminal gangs, 
it would not be, at present, ‘pragmatic’ to create a distinct crime against humanity of 
human trafficking (Cooper, 2011: 24) as the current requirement for State policy to be 
implemented would create a barrier for the prosecution of human trafficking offences. 
At this stage, it is apparent that human trafficking, as both a subspecies of slavery and in 
its own right, is a sufficiently grievous offence to merit inclusion in the Rome Statute, 
and therefore should not require the establishment of its own, separate court to try such 
offences (Cooper, 2011: 13). However, the ICC would only have jurisdiction where it 
could be proved that the commission of the offence occurred in relation to a ‘State or 
organizational’ policy. The freedom that would be gained from the release of such a 
requirement is shown in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
case of Prosecutor v Kunarac, in which the convicted individuals were held to have 
enslaved women for the purposes of servitude and sexual exploitation. The conditions 
and treatment suffered by the women was the focus of the prosecution and in particular, 
the duration of the enslavement was not held to be a relevant factor (Kunarac, judgment: 
121). However, working within the confines of the Rome Statute at present, what will 
be explored next is what is meant by an ‘organization’ or ‘organizational policy.’   
 
At present, the problem with human trafficking relates to its commission by 
organised transnational criminal gangs, who fall outwith the ambit of human rights law, 
by not having any responsibilities in this area. The conflict here is therefore between the 
inclusion of trafficking and slavery offences within the Rome Statute, but with the 
added requirement that such crimes are committed on behalf of the State or a State-like 
entity. The next section therefore proposes to examine the possibility of an organised 
criminal gang being considered an ‘organization’ for the purposes of the Rome Statute, 
this being the only way in which human trafficking, as currently defined within the 
Rome Statute, could be tried at the ICC. 
 
III. INCLUDING CRIMINAL GANGS WITHIN THE ICC’S JURISDICTION – ORGANISATIONS 
AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
 
At present, slavery can be considered a crime against humanity. However this 
presents an additional problem, given that the crime is most often committed by 
organised criminal gangs, rather than States. Organised criminals, human traffickers 
specifically, are generally acting in an illicit fashion and therefore cannot be held to 
account in the same way as those acting on behalf of political or commercial 
organizations, or nation States might, as the consideration of the position of non-state 
actors is generally held to view these ‘participants’ (Alston, 2000) in the international 
legal system as lawful, at least at inception. There is potential for the gangs themselves 
to be considered organisations, as such as the Elements would require an organisational 
policy to be in place, which would also satisfy the ‘widespread or systematic’ criterion, 
the systematic element being of the greatest relevance. The viability of this argument 
would not be challenged by the bounds of the jurisdiction of the ICC provided the 
individuals accused were natural persons (Rome Statute: article 25) and providing that 
either the crime occurred on the territory of a State party (Rome Statute: article 
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12(2)(a)) or concerned one of their nationals (Rome Statute: article 12(2)(b)). 
Furthermore, there has been an assumption on the part of previous international criminal 
tribunals, in that these have assumed a ‘legal ability to enter into relations with non-state 
actors, not just through the conclusion of international agreements, but also by assuming 
the authority to request material and co-operation in general’ (d’Aspremont, 2011: 198) 
Furthermore, non-state actors are arguably bound by customary law, such as common 
article three of the Geneva Convention 1949 (Milanovic, 2011: 40). It is submitted that 
the illicit nature of these organisations does not necessarily bar them from being 
considered organisations for the purposes of human trafficking offences as defined by 
the Rome Statute, and accordingly from satisfying the requirement of the existence of 
an ‘organizational policy.’ Indeed, the ICC represents the fruition of efforts to 
‘implement the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ 
(Graefrath, 1990: 67) The Code itself envisaged exercising jurisdiction over ‘any 
organization or group’ (Draft code: article 18) in respect of crimes against humanity, 
and the Rome Statute fails to define what an organization might be, other than to require 
an organisation which is accused of an enforced disappearance be ‘political’ (Rome 
Statute: article 7(1)(i)) arguably creating a gap which the ICC may wish to fill through 
determining its own competence (Rome Statute: article 19(1)) over organised criminal 
gangs. 
 
Arguably, the recognition of such organisations would be sufficient to establish 
their ‘participation’ in the international legal order. Under international law, there are a 
number of ways in which legal personality can be attributed. In this context, the 
recognition theory of legal personality (Portmann, 2010: 81) is relevant; the example of 
the Order of Malta (Portmann, 2010: 119) being considered a participant in the 
international legal order because other States recognise it as such. The current theories 
in the area are those of formalism and individualism (Portmann, 2010: 248), the latter 
theory being of the greatest relevance to this argument. As organised criminal gangs 
must have human participants in order to carry out their activities, the recognition of 
their existence can be determined by examining their constituent parts. As their 
constituent parts participate in the international legal order, through violating 
international criminal law, the gangs themselves must participate and thereby the 
‘organizational policy’ is evidenced. The idea behind this is to stretch the definition of 
such crimes and requirements excessively, but rather because there is much to support 
the idea that human trafficking should be considered a crime against humanity. In 
particular, ‘the crime may be excluded from statutes of limitations which forbid 
prosecution after a certain period of time, the perpetrators can be denied refugee status 
or asylum, there will be added obligations on states to cooperate, and in some 
jurisdictions the crime may come within a state’s national criminal jurisdiction whereas 
without the label ‘crime against humanity’ it might not’ (Clapham, 2006: 106) This 
supports the contention that it may be useful to retain human trafficking as a crime 
against humanity. 
 
The inclusion of the requirement of a State or organizational policy, however 
construed, presents problems. This approach differs from that of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Statute of which had no reference to a 
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‘State or organizational policy’ in its definition of crimes against humanity (Rome 
Statute: article 5) Indeed the prosecution undertaken in Kunarac would have been 
undermined by such a requirement, in which the convicted individuals were held to 
have enslaved women for the purposes of servitude and sexual exploitation. The 
conditions and treatment suffered by the women was the focus of the prosecution and in 
particular, the duration of the enslavement was not held to be a relevant factor (Kunarac 
judgment: 121). It is relevant that the odiousness of the crime was held in this case to be 
important, rather than measuring the severity of the crime through cataloguing the 
number who had been subjected to such treatment. This may indicate that the inclusion 
of human trafficking as part of a crime against humanity is not appropriate for this 
particular crime. Regardless of how it can be fitted in to the current scope of the Rome 
Statute, it may simply be that the most suitable place for the crime of human trafficking 
is as a discrete international crime. 
 
Considering the difficulties that stretching the current definition of human 
trafficking, organizational policies and the jurisdiction of the ICC in general pose, it 
must be asked as to why national governments cannot deal with the issue of human 
trafficking as a violation of domestic criminal law. Clearly, the existence of the 
complementarity principle demonstrates that national level prosecutions must be 
exhausted prior to the jurisdiction of the ICC being triggered, unless in circumstances 
where the State is unwilling or unable to prosecute.
 
Indeed, this concept is seen as one 
of the guiding principles of the ICC, in that it does not have primary jurisdiction and 
indeed should only be used where the proceedings undertaken by States fail’ (Sheng, 
2006-2007: 415). One of the main issues with giving the ICC jurisdiction in the area of 
human trafficking, and effectively in other areas, is that it ‘could be seen as a form of 
colonisation or establishing power’ (Ryngaert, 2008: 226). However, this argument can 
neutered by brief reference to the seriousness of the crime itself, which indicates that it 
is appropriate that the ICC have jurisdiction over it. A secondary argument is that of 
effective prosecution; frequently, it cannot be, and is not, always dealt with in an 
effective manner at State level. The existence of State-based controls to combat a 
transnational network is something which contributes to the lack of prosecutions in this 
area (Shelley, 2011: 138) and where States are unable or unwilling to prosecute, the 
ICC ought to assume jurisdiction for this crime. At present, this is difficult given the 
inclusion of a limited definition of the crime as a crime against humanity, which creates 
certain thresholds for the commission of a crime. This does not necessarily end 
impunity, as it might, in terms of prosecuting an individual accused of human 
trafficking under the ICC at present. 
 
The comparison has naturally been made between human trafficking and piracy 
(Cohen, 2010) both as forms of transnational criminal activity which require collective 
action by a number of jurisdictions through the application of universal jurisdiction. 
Indeed, pirates were generally considered ‘enemies of all mankind’ on account of a lack 
of citizenship and centrally due to the enforcement difficulties of prosecuting a crime 
committed on the high seas (Ryngaert, 2008: 109). Reflecting on the Rome Statute, the 
crime of piracy is something of a deliberate omission and clearly did not fit into the 
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framework of crimes against humanity. It is generally not considered to be a core 
international crime (Ryngaert, 2008: 109).  
 
Similarly, it may further prevent impunity to acknowledge that this problem is 
such that each and every State has a right and a duty to exercise jurisdiction over this 
crime. It has been argued that, ‘if human trafficking is treated as a crime of universal 
concern, it will become part of a category of serious crimes viewed with such 
abhorrence that they warrant universal condemnation.’ (Cohen, 2010: 234). Universal 
jurisdiction is another, separate issue, but could be useful in preventing impunity 
through affording jurisdiction to any States which prosecute. The inclusion of human 
trafficking as a core international crime in the Rome Statute may hasten the adoption of 
universal jurisdiction over such a crime by indicating a consensus on the seriousness of 
such conduct. 
 
It would also afford human trafficking the necessary footing as one of the ‘most 
serious crimes of international concern.’ This would not necessarily require that every 
act of human trafficking would be covered, as the admissibility threshold would need to 
be reached by the acts themselves. Thus complementarity would remain the 
‘gatekeeper’ (Sheng 2006-2007: 452) for ICC prosecutions and investigations.  
 
IV. HUMAN TRAFFICKING AS A CORE CRIME: USING THE ‘GENOCIDE’ THRESHOLD AS 
A TEST 
 
The proposal herein is to address the gap created by the Rome Statute in the area 
of human trafficking by explicitly including it in the Statute as a core international 
crime, in the form defined by the United Nations. This would place human trafficking in 
Article five, alongside genocide, aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
terms of the offences over which the court has jurisdiction. The way in which it is 
proposed that this ought to be done is to use the conceptual threshold requirements of 
the crime of genocide within the Rome Statute as a theoretical model. The current 
treatment of human trafficking is via the use of mutual criminal assistance agreements 
based on traditional jurisdictional principles, and thus these lack the quality of ‘core 
international crimes’, which create individual responsibility independently of domestic 
law. In the absence of domestic provisions, and will, there can be no trial for such 
crimes, unless provision is made to transform human trafficking into a core international 
crime, under article five of the Rome Statute. The inclusion of human trafficking in 
article five would avoid this issue. Human trafficking would therefore be defined 
separately from enslavement in order to fully prosecute the commission of the crime at 
higher levels within the criminal organisations, as ‘an evolution of the scope of (the) 
notion (of crimes covered by the ICC) is not impossible’ (Coracini, 2008: 701-702). 
 
Genocide within the Rome Statute may involve torture, killing, confinement in 
inhuman conditions, birth control or forcible transfer or deportation of a population.
 
It 
does not necessarily mean that any of these crimes, in isolation, will be considered 
genocide, but rather that they must be committed with ‘specific intent.’ This is defined 
by the Rome Statute as being ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
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racial or religious group,’ using any of the crimes specified above. This idea is usually 
known as ‘special’ or ‘specific’ intent, in that the individual accused is concerned with 
the eradication of the targeted group and uses one of the methods above to achieve this 
aim. The reach of the crime of genocide, in respect of the ‘groups’ which are protected 
by the provision, will not be discussed here, as it is the idea of specific intent which is 
of most value to the discussion here. 
 
This idea of specific intent means that act of genocide does not need to be 
committed in pursuance of a ‘State or organizational policy’ but rather simply needs to 
be in pursuance of the ideology of eradicating that specific group. This means that there 
is no need to attribute responsibility to a specific State or organisation, nor does the 
attack need to be qualified as widespread or systematic (Prosecutor v Jelisic, 1995). As 
such, the concept of a ‘lone genocidaire’ has already been tackled by the Jelisic case in 
international law, in that an individual may commit one of the crimes specified in article 
6 and be convicted of genocide where the intent was present. The Elements of Crimes 
require the acts to take place as part of a ‘manifest pattern of similar conduct,’ 
specifically an ‘emerging pattern.’ Effectively this means that the conduct should take 
place as part in a way that it can be identified as more than one incident in isolation, 
which creates a lower threshold than that of a ‘widespread and systematic attack.’ 
Critically, it is the egregiousness of the underlying rationale for the attack which 
qualifies the crime for inclusion within the Rome Statute, without regard to the 
underlying policy for which it was committed nor to the number of victims claimed by 
the actors in questions. As such, this specific or special intent provides a useful 
theoretical model on which to base a proposed crime of human trafficking within the 
Rome Statute. The threshold which must be reached by the actor when committing a 
crime of genocide relates directly to the intent, rather than to the extent of the criminal 
behaviour. It is not considered that there should be any parallel drawn between the 
crime of genocide and human trafficking; rather the way in which genocide falls within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC is relevant. It is therefore proposed that the inclusion of 
human trafficking within the Rome Statute should attract a similar threshold 
requirement as part of crimes which are committed by criminal gangs. Trafficking by 
criminal gangs, the most likely perpetrators of such a crime, would necessarily fall 
outwith the definition of human trafficking as a crime against humanity, unless such 
gangs were acknowledged as State-like entities. One would hope this is unlikely, given 
the incongruous nature of such a conclusion with human rights responsibilities of other 
State and State-like entities. 
 
The possibility of including human trafficking as a core international exists as it 
has been acknowledged that, although ‘the International Criminal Court does not have 
jurisdiction over all international crimes and it is understood that definitions or lists of 
crimes that are within the jurisdiction of the ICC are not meant to be exclusive or to 
limit in any way the customary definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
or the reach more generally of customary international law (Paust, 2010: 712). It is 
argued that human trafficking, as a branch of slavery, ought to be explicitly included as 
a core crime in international law, having regard to its heinousness and the difficulty of 
transnational and domestic mechanisms of prosecution. However it is not argued that 
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every act of human trafficking ought to fall within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute. 
In viewing crimes against humanity as ‘widespread and systematic attacks’ based on 
State policy and genocide as a crime requiring the specific intent to eradicate a certain 
group of individuals, human trafficking should be considered a crime within the Rome 
Statute as defined within the Trafficking Protocol, but with the additional threshold that 
the accused intends to gain a profit in some way from obtaining or maintaining control 
over the victim of trafficking. This form of special intent may appear, initially, to be a 
low threshold for a core international crime but may assist in preventing impunity for 
such crimes. Generally, the concept of profiting is at the heart of human trafficking as a 
crime, in that the individuals concerned are transferred or maintained in slavery to pay 
their ‘owners’ or ‘employers’ a certain amount of money. The most serious human 
trafficking crimes involve organised operations spanning across countries in a dense 
network, the extent of which the authorities are not able to properly track, a fact evident 
in the lack of precise statistics in this area. The desire of the ICC not to tackle ‘low-
hanging fruit’ and attribute responsibility to leaders and commanders, coupled with the 
requirement that the individuals would profit from such an undertaking, may provide 
the relevant threshold for human trafficking being considered a core international crime. 
It would also target criminal gangs without recognising such gangs as organisations 
proper, but rather disaggregate them into the individual criminals that they are. In doing 
so, the heads of the organisation could be prosecuted in the way that war criminals have 
been publicly indicted and exposed at the ICC in recent years. Such an inclusion within 
the Rome Statute would create the required bridge between international and 
transnational operations, elevating the crime itself to a level of seriousness which it does 
merit, being a modern form of slavery, but without requiring that the attack was 
widespread or systematic, or that it was undertaken by an organisation or State. Rather 
it distinguishes the crime as something separate and deserving of unique attention in the 
Statute, given the consequences that it has for both individual dignity and global 
stability. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Human trafficking, as a modern form of slavery, is undoubtedly an issue for 
international criminal justice. As the ‘centrepiece’ for a ‘fair and effective system’ of 
international criminal justice (Sunga, 1998: 399) the Rome Statute should extend its 
jurisdiction to the crime of human trafficking as a crime against humanity. The 
existence of a ‘silent war’ (Kim, 2011: 32) in which traffickers and victims are difficult 
to trace leads to the conclusion that the exposure which elevation to the jurisdiction of 
the ICC would offer should be undertaken to promote the idea that the offence is as 
serious as any of the serious crimes noted in the Rome Statute. However as a crime it 
should not be tucked away with the other crimes against humanity, given the current 
constraints of the definition, which may be appropriate in terms of other named 
offences, such as torture. Rather it is proposed that the ICC declare jurisdiction over 
human trafficking as a discrete crime under the Rome Statute, following the idea of 
placing individual restrictions on the prosecution of the crime at the ICC, in the same 
way as the crime of genocide has been uniquely defined. 
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Including human trafficking as a crime against humanity would entail the 
satisfaction of the ‘widespread and systematic attack’ requirement, as well as the 
commission of the attack as part of a ‘State or organizational policy.’ The justification 
for the inclusion of the first requirement, which would prevent a future Kunarac et al. 
being tried under the Rome Statute, is that the ICC has been created to prevent future 
‘unimaginable atrocities’ (Schabas, 2012: 29) and such a function would be undermined 
by the application of the law therein to ‘ordinary’ attacks, even where these took place 
on a large scale. However, the problem with retaining this requirement is that human 
trafficking, in the context of organised crime, cannot presently be prosecuted at the ICC 
as the crimes committed by organised criminal gangs are not done in pursuance of a 
‘State or organizational policy.’ Coupled with the fact that the international treaties on 
trafficking are simply ‘mutual criminal assistance agreements based on traditional 
jurisdictional principles’ (Tavakoli, 2002: 79), it is clear that the ICC is not even being 
considered as a useful way in which to limit the powers of highly organised criminal 
gangs who are committing unimaginable atrocities in an industrialised fashion. 
 
The second requirement, that of an organisational or State policy being the 
underlying rationale for the attack, may create issues in that criminal gangs, the main 
perpetrators of human trafficking offences, would need to be considered ‘organizations’ 
for the purposes of the Statute. It is not disputed that the policies may be organizational, 
but it is rejected that they should receive acceptance in the international legal order. The 
criminal gangs should be considered as separate criminal individuals, with those at the 
helm of the organisations being prosecuted for deriving profit from the human suffering 
they orchestrate through trafficking individuals. 
 
‘The ICC is not and should not be regarded as a panacea’ (Ronen, 2010: 27) but 
it should recognise the crime of human trafficking as one which is of ‘serious concern to 
the international community as a whole’, in the same vein as the other crimes within its 
jurisdiction The most pragmatic way of achieving this recognition would be to include 
human trafficking as a discrete crime within the Rome Statute within article five. 
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